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 Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency 
Abstract: 
Situationists such as John Doris (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2010), Gilbert Harman (2000, 
2009, 2010), and Maria Merritt (2000, 2009, 2010) suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral 
dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it.  This 
paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules 
out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and 
resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we 
learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications 
of its adoption) as well as something about trust (in particular, that the conditions necessary 
for genuine trust include a belief in a capacity for robust dispositions). 
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Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency1 
How must we think of others in order for us to have the confidence to trust them?  What 
sort of capacity must we take ourselves to have to consider ourselves worthy of the trust of 
others? This paper examines the relationship between the capacity for consistent dispositions 
and the conditions necessary for trust and trustworthiness.  Situationists such as John Doris 
(1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2010), Gilbert Harman (2000, 2009, 2010), and Maria Merritt (2000, 
2009, 2010) suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with 
without radical revision to morality as we know it.  This paper challenges this supposition, 
arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to 
suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By 
examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in 
particular, the radically revisionary moral implications of its adoption) as well as something 
about trust (in particular, that the conditions necessary for genuine trust include a belief in a 
capacity for robust dispositions). 
Philosophical situationism2 pictures the world as a morally dangerous place.3  For 
situationists, the kinds of character traits presupposed by virtue theorists – honesty and 
dishonesty, compassion and callousness, courage and cowardice - are very rare, if not 
altogether illusory.  People are not honest, kind, or courageous; rather, they find themselves 
in situations that conduce to honest, kind, or courageous behavior.  Consequently, 
situationists argue, if the situation is altered in even seemingly trivial and morally irrelevant 
respects, we should not be surprised to find behavior that is dishonest, callous, or cowardly. 
Situationists maintain that both moral deliberation and moral evaluation must be purged of 
the characterological modes of reasoning used by Aristotelian virtue ethicists.   
The controversy regarding whether philosophical situationism undermines the plausibility of 
virtue theory has already garnered much attention.  Philosophers sympathetic to virtue 
theory have argued vigorously that the situationists attack an impoverished conception of 
virtue that is focused narrowly on behavior, ignoring the role of practical reason in virtue 
properly conceived.4  In turn, situationists raise doubts about the extent to which agents 
exhibit rational control of their actions, and draw attention to the frequency with which 
agents act contrary to their reflective commitments.5  There are no signs of a détente 
between the two camps, much less a resolution. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This paper benefitted from the contributions of many philosophers. In particular, many of the ideas in this 
paper grew out of discussions with Rachel Cohon on our collaborative project on promises and consistency. I 
also received feedback from William FitzPatrick, my commentator at the Creighton Club conference, and Brian 
Talbot, my commentator at the 2014 APA Pacific meeting. I received valuable comments from Bradley 
Armour-Garb, Edward Dubois, Michelle Mason, and anonymous referees from this journal as well as another 
journal.   
2 I use “philosophical situationism” and “situationism” interchangeably in what follows. Historically, the view 
called “situationism” in social psychology denies both local and global traits.  As I explain below, contemporary 
philosophical situationists are not committed to the denial of local traits.  
3 This phrase comes from Doris: “Reflection on situationism has an obvious benefit: It reminds us that the 
world is a morally dangerous place.” (2002, 146) 
4 See Swanton 2003, Kamtekar 2004, Annas 2005.  Commentators have also expressed skepticism about 
whether the empirical evidence supports eliminativism about character.  See Sreenivassen 2002, Miller 2003, 
2013, Kamtekar 2004,  Arpaly 2005, Snow 2010, Sabini et al 2001. 
5 See Nelkin 2005; Woolfolk et al. 2006; Nahmias 2007, Merritt, Doris & Harman 2010, Vargas 2013. 
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In this paper I propose to advance the debate by shifting its grounds.  Instead of addressing 
the question of whether situationists target the best conception of virtue, or whether the 
empirical evidence suggests that virtue is impossible or near impossible for beings with 
psychologies like ours, I accept arguendo situationism’s claims about the rarity of consistent 
dispositions and I begin to draw out some of the implications of what it means to live life as 
a situationist.  In doing this I aim to show how deeply morally revisionary situationism really 
is.  
The focus of my investigation is the consequence of situationism for trust. It barely deserves 
mention that trust is an essential ethical foundation of social life.  But the mantle of trust is 
so fundamental that it is often noticed only when trust is absent. When people feel only 
pessimism toward themselves and toward each other, the social institutions and personal 
relations that depend on trust for their functioning come apart.  Indeed, a frequent lament of 
the abused and of the betrayed is that they have lost the ability to trust.  Without this ability, 
a person can neither form relations of intimacy nor reap the benefits of full engagement in 
cooperative activity. Consider the faith in others that one must have when one entrusts one’s 
children to a team of daycare staff, a babysitter, or even to a family member.  It may be 
possible to put certain checks in place – state inspectors at the daycare or a video camera in 
the baby’s room, for instance.  But ultimately there is no substitute for trusting the people 
who take care of one’s children.  The only other option is never to let one’s children out of 
one’s sight – but even that requires trusting oneself.  
In addition to trust’s value in the private sphere, trust has great practical value in public and 
commercial life.  Because trust removes the necessity to check up on people, trust renders 
cooperation more fruitful and efficient.  It is for this reason that political economists 
understand trust as a kind of “social capital”.6  Some even argue that “high trust” societies 
are more likely to flourish economically.7 But the value of trust goes deeper than fostering 
cooperation. Trusting someone is a way of treating them as a person and of thereby signaling 
respect.8 This is a crucial insight of the Strawsonian “participant stance” account of trust that 
I draw on in this work. 
It is my contention that the adoption of situationism undermines the conditions necessary 
for realizing trust’s value.  The considerations I adduce are not aimed at a direct 
demonstration of the falsity of situationism. Ethical qualms about the implications of 
adopting a descriptive theory do not serve to falsity it. Rather, my arguments shows that 
situationism has implications that both situationists themselves and their critics have failed to 
reckon with. Although it is my view that the situationist inference that human beings lack 
consistency far outstrips the evidence, it is not my aim to argue for that claim here.9 Belief in 
situationism, whether or not such belief is justified or true, has implications that are 
damaging to aspects of our moral lives lived through social institutions that derive much of 
their value from trust.   
In Section 1 I briefly recapitulate the core situationist claims.  In Section 2 I describe how 
the adoption of situationism recommends a practical strategy of “hedging” in dealing with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Fukayama, 1995. 
7 See Inglehart, 1999. 
8 See Holton, 1994. 
9 See Sreenivasen, 2002. 
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others.  In Section 3 I  argue that such a strategy, if generalized, is incompatible with 
interpersonal trust.  In Section 4 I argue that the adoption of situationism necessitates 
withdrawal from a broad network of Strawsonian “reactive attitudes” relating to trust and 
trustworthiness. This withdrawal prevents us from trusting others as opposed to merely 
relying on them. Finally, in the concluding section I make some speculative remarks about 
how the adoption of situationism may have the effect of actually making people less 
trustworthy. 
§1  The situationist challenge 
At the heart of the situationist challenge is the contention that we systematically 
underestimate the influence of the situation in explaining human behavior and overestimate 
the influence of purportedly fixed features of the agent.  Apparently inconsequential and 
deliberatively irrelevant features of the situation predict and explain behavior, swamping the 
influence of deliberative agency.  Crucially, these “situational inputs” typically operate 
without the awareness of the agent. When experimental subjects are later asked about the 
influence of such factors on their decision-making, a common response is outright denial.   
Situationists support claims about the non-existence of character by appeal to empirical 
studies showing that human dispositions to behave are time and again disappointingly 
unreliable, and that such unreliable behavior is not consistent with the existence of robust 
traits of character.  Subtle environmental variables inaccessible to conscious deliberation 
systemically interrupt the tendency of individuals to act in trait-congruent ways.  As a result, 
situationists argue, to rely on the putative character traits of others is to invite 
disappointment and injury.  To rely on one’s own putative character traits is to expose others 
to analogous jeopardy. 
Situationists maintain that our common practice of attributing good or bad character traits is 
empirically under-supported because individuals fail to act in trait consistent ways when 
morally irrelevant environmental variables are introduced.  Philosophical situationists appeal 
to landmark experiments in a long “situationist” experimental tradition in psychology.  
Below are listed some of the seminal experiments of what became a significant research 
program: 
• Isen and Levin (1972) discovered that subjects who had just found a dime were 22 
times more likely to help a woman who had dropped some papers than subjects who 
did not find a dime. 
• Haney et al. (1973) describe Philip Zimbardo’s infamous “Stanford Prison 
Experiment” where college students merely role-playing as guards commit acts of 
real cruelty and abuse. 
• Darley and Batson (1973) report that passersby in a hurry were six times less likely to 
help a person in significant distress than passersby not in a hurry. 
• Stanley Milgram (1974) found that subjects would administer what they believed to 
be painful electric shocks at the polite request of an experimenter perceived as an 
authority. 
• Matthews and Cannon (1975) report that subjects were 5 times less likely to help an 
injured man in the presence of the sound of a loud lawnmower. 
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These experiments and many others in the same spirit are taken by situationists to be 
representative rather than aberrational. Experimenters manage to induce disappointing 
omissions as well as appalling behavior by manipulating seemingly trivial situational 
variables.  Indeed, situationists emphasize how insubstantial the situational influences that 
produce moral failure can be.  And to recapitulate: in many experiments these influences are 
both inaccessible to conscious awareness and deliberatively irrelevant from the point of view 
of the agent.  
Situationists do not insist that the body of empirical evidence rules out the possibility that a 
person may act in the same way repeatedly when faced with a similar situation (Doris terms 
this tendency stability).  Rather, they think that the empirical evidence rules out consistency, the 
reliable manifestation of trait-relevant behaviors across a diversity of trait-relevant eliciting 
conditions (Doris, 2002, 22).  A philosophical situationist may grant the possibility of local 
traits, dispositions that are reliably manifested only within a narrow range of highly specified 
conditions – traits such as “dime-finding-dropped-paper compassionate” and “sailing-in-
rough-weather courageous.” (Doris 2002; 115)  But the supposition that human beings have 
consistent dispositions – dispositions that can be relied on across diverse situation-types – is 
claimed to be an untenable and discredited bit of folk psychology.  The supposition’s 
pervasiveness, and our disinclination to revise it even in the light of overwhelming counter-
evidence, is explained by the influence of the Fundamental Attribution Error, the cognitive 
bias that leads us to favor explanations based on internal personality characteristics (Harman 
1999). 
Philosophical situationists maintain that the situationist research program in psychology has 
important implications for normative ethics. Doris (2002) contends that virtue theory’s 
recommendation to cultivate the virtues is one that very few (if any) of us can ever hope to 
achieve or even to approximate.  Moreover, even more empirically modest forms of virtue 
ethics that exhort us to reflect on imagined virtuous exemplars for moral guidance are 
destined to alienate and to mislead since these exemplars are constituted so differently from 
ourselves.  Harman (1999) argues further that traditional conceptions of character have 
deplorable effects, distorting discussions of law and public policy and leading to dangerous 
misunderstandings of other people.  
Maria Merritt (2000) proposes a revisionary (to the Aristotelian) conception of virtue that 
openly acknowledges its ongoing dependence of particular social relationships and settings.  
Merritt maintains that acknowledging the “sustaining social contribution” to character forces 
us to give up the thesis of “motivational self-sufficiency of character”: roughly, the idea that 
we are able to act consistently absent the relevant supportive social and institutional 
situational pressures.  The best we can hope for is “stability supported more contingently by 
climates of social expectation.” (380)  With this more modest goal in mind, we ought to 
“take an active, discriminating interest in the climates of social expectation we inhabit.” (381)  
Given what the situationist research tells us about the power of situational influence, the 
goal of consistency absent social support is neither reasonable nor useful.   
Doris’s call for “scientific psychological realism” (113) in ethics requires that we abandon 
theories that presuppose the achievability of reliable and robust dispositions.  Doris avers 
that “many times […] confidence in character is precisely what puts people at risk in morally 
dangerous situations.” (147) He presents the case of a flirtatious colleague who invites you to 
dinner: “If you take the lessons of situationism to heart, you avoid the dinner like the plague 
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[…]. You do not doubt that you sincerely value fidelity; you simply doubt your ability to act 
in conformity with this value once the candles are lit and the wine begins to flow.” (147)  
Doris’s advice in the case of the flirtatious colleague amounts to a hedge.  Although dinner 
might be socially pleasant and intellectually stimulating, he suggests that you should hedge 
the risk that you will tempted to infidelity by politely refusing the invitation. Doris thinks 
that we should be skeptical of the warrant of self-trust.  His skepticism is grounded in 
disbelief in the possibility of robust traits (in this case, the trait of fidelity).  Doris’s advice in 
this case is very much in the spirit of Merritt’s view that when the “sustaining social 
contribution” to virtue is absent, we should not aim for or expect motivational self-
sufficiency.  In what follows, I argue that this attitude of hedging is endemic to situationism 
as a moral stance, and that it is incompatible with forming relations of trust. 
§2. Hedging and Trust 
The term of hedging refers to a strategy of insuring oneself against a loss.  For example, a 
vegetable farmer may sell futures at the time of planting to protect herself in the event that 
crop prices fall precipitously when it comes time to harvest. Conversely, airlines purchase 
options on jet fuel to avert the risk of sharply higher prices in the future.  Although the term 
itself is most commonly used in finance (futures, swaps, options, and derivatives are all used 
for hedging), this type of strategy is pervasive in many domains of life.  At its core, hedging 
is a defensive posture in the face of uncertainty, a method of mitigating the severity of feared 
negative outcomes by expending resources to protect oneself in the event that they obtain.  
Hedging is rational response to an unpredictable and sometimes inhospitable environment.  
A worker who fears his factory will be shuttered because of foreign competition may send 
out job applications to other plants, even though he would prefer to stay where he is.  A 
student who is uncertain about whether she will be accepted to her preferred college may 
invest resources applying to various “safety” schools. Ceteris paribus, the higher the stakes, 
the more likely we are to hedge. 
Hedging strategies also become more salient when we learn that relevant outcomes are 
influenced by chaotic or random processes. Suppose you learn that new research in 
meteorology indicates that near-term climactic conditions are more susceptible to 
unpredictable chaotic elements than previously thought, and that as a result the weather 
predictions on the nightly news are less reliable than previously imagined.  What would be a 
rational response to such a modification in one’s epistemic position?  Along with assigning 
lower subjective probability to a weatherman’s confident prediction that the weekend will be 
sunny, it would also make sense to pack a raincoat just in case.  
The species of hedging relevant to this discussion is a strategy designed to address a 
perceived lack of capacity for consistency.  Here I refer specifically to Doris’s sense of 
consistency as the reliable manifestation of trait-relevant behaviors across a diversity of trait-
relevant eliciting conditions.  Hedging is an appropriate response to a context in which one 
makes a determination that a person is not sufficiently consistent to be relied on.   
For example, if Carmen promises to pick up Josephine at the airport, but Josephine doubts 
Carmen’s capacity for consistency in face of situational pressures, then Josephine may carry 
extra cash so that she has enough money to take a taxi home. The reason that Josephine 
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hedges is that she does not trust Carmen to pull through and make good on her promise if, 
for instance, she is distracted by a televised hockey game that runs into overtime. 
A strategy of hedging is rational when one doubts another person’s capacity for consistent 
dispositions. If Carmen is considering whether to tell Josephine about a new job offer, but 
she is uncertain whether Josephine is reliably discreet, Carmen may withhold the information 
even if she values Josephine’s advice about whether to take the job.  If Carmen does not 
think that she can count on Josephine’s discretion after Josephine has had a few glasses of 
wine, she may forgo her counsel.  She may tell another friend about the job even though she 
values his opinion less, simply because she trusts his discretion more.   
§3 Trust in the face of situationism 
In contrast to hedging strategies, which essentially involve shielding oneself from the risk 
that others behave unreliably, trust essentially involves exposing oneself to the risk that the 
people one trusts will not pull through.  Although there is much controversy regarding the 
appropriate motivation of the trustee in a trusting relationship, most commentators agree 
that trusting others paradigmatically requires that we: 
(1) Render ourselves vulnerable to the people we trust. In particular, we render 
ourselves vulnerable to their betrayal of our trust, which elicits characteristic 
attitudinal responses (e.g. indignation).  
(2) Be optimistic that others are competent to do what we trust them to do. 
(3) Be optimistic that others are committed to doing what we trust them to do.10  
Avoiding reliance and vulnerability by hatching elaborate contingency plans is incompatible 
with trust. Suppose Ingrid elicits a promise from Seth that he will not touch the last few 
macaroons in the refrigerator because she had already promised tonight’s dinner guests her 
famous macaroons, for which they have expressed enthusiastic anticipation.  If on the way 
home Ingrid picks up ice cream just in case Seth succumbs to the macaroons, this is a good 
indication that Ingrid does not trust Seth to do as he says he will.  Her hedging indicates that 
either she is not sufficiently optimistic that Seth is competent to keep his promise (perhaps 
she thinks he is not strong willed enough) or that she is not sufficiently optimistic that he is 
committed (perhaps she thinks he simply does not care enough about keeping his word). 
For the most part we only trust people we deem competent and committed.11  Trust may or 
may not be warranted (well-grounded), depending on the trustworthiness of the trustee.12  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I adapt these conditions from McLeod’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry entitled “Trust” (summer 2014 
edition).  
11 Some have argued that optimism about the competence and commitment of the trusted party, although 
typical, may be absent in some instances of trust (Pettit 1995, Walker 2006, McGeer 2008).  Horsburgh (1960) 
describes “therapeutic trust” as trust whose aim it is to help make the trusted party trustworthy, even though 
she may not be already.  McGeer offers the example of parents who trust their teenagers with the house or the 
family car, “believing that their offspring may well abuse their trust, but hoping by such trust to elicit, in the 
fullness of time, more responsible and responsive trustworthy behavior.” (241)  Such trust differs from 
paradigmatic trust in that it is compatible with relative pessimism on the part of the truster.  Nonetheless, there 
must still be the normative expectation that the trustee ought to do what he is trusted to do (Jones 2012).  
When the trustee fails to pull through, the trusting party feels not only unhappy but also betrayed; the trustee 
feels not only regretful but also guilty. I think the argument below applies to both paradigmatic and therapeutic 
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Our estimation of the warrant for trust, that is, our estimation of whether the conditions for 
rational trust exist, is determined at least in part by our assessment of the reliability of the 
trustee. This assessment is grounded in our optimism or pessimism about the trusted party’s 
competence and commitment to do what they are trusted to do. A necessary condition on 
Ingrid trusting Seth is that she believe that Seth has a reliable disposition to resist temptation 
when the stakes are raised.  Absent this belief, the conditions for trust do not obtain.  If 
Ingrid is a situationist she will not believe that individuals are capable of such reliable 
dispositions.  
The situationist, pointing out that trust does not, and indeed cannot, require certainty, might 
reply by insisting that Ingrid’s trust in Seth’s reliability may indeed be warranted, since in this 
kind of situation there is no reason to think that Seth is unreliable. In other words, the 
situationist may claim that Ingrid may rely on the stability of Seth’s “local trait”. Ingrid may 
decide that Seth is sufficiently reliable in this narrow domain by reflecting on his track 
record: on many other occasions when she has relied on him on matters related to 
household entertaining, he has always pulled through. So, she thinks, she can rationally 
expect the stability of this admittedly narrow trait. The situationist may suggest that we 
generalize this strategy of relying only on local traits and that we revise our attitudes and 
practices so that they are compatible with situationism’s denial of consistent dispositions. 
This revised set of attitudes and practices would be constitutive of “situationist trust” or “s-
trust”. The situationist might maintain that as it stands we are dangerously promiscuous in 
trusting others: our attitudes and practices relating to trust are both unwarranted and 
imprudent since they presuppose the existence of global traits. Trust and trustworthiness as 
we now think of them ought to be substituted with s-trust and corresponding s-
trustworthiness. If A s-trusts B, then A counts on B only in a very narrow range of situation 
types. Changes to the situation, even minor changes of no moral significance, vitiate the 
warrant of s-trust. Correspondingly, if B is s-trustworthy, she can be counted on only in very 
narrow range of situation-types.  
For example, if what Merritt calls the “sustaining social contribution” is absent, then all bets 
are off. Substituting trust with s-trust would necessitate significant changes to our reactive 
attitudes. For example, we would not respond with resentment when others cave in to 
situational pressure and we would not feel guilty, ashamed, or diminished when we ourselves 
fail to come through in such circumstances. We might be disappointed in the sense that we 
can be disappointed when our lottery number doesn’t come up, but we would not be let 
down in our normative expectations. Rather, we would regard people who fail to pull 
through with what Strawson dubbed the “objective attitude” and turn our minds toward 
avoiding reliance on them or, alternatively, to ways of inducing them to behave in the ways 
we need. Conversely, when others achieve reliability, we will chalk it up to situational 
support rather than grit or conscientiousness.  
The situationist might welcome such revision. Indeed, the situationist may claim that she is 
simply dissuading us from being naïve or Pollyannaish in our trust of others thereby sparing 
us from disappointment and bitterness. She might identify in us a hazardous tendency to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
trust, although an anonymous referee from this journal points out to me that it is debatable whether betrayal is 
an appropriate response to broken trust that is merely therapeutic. 
12 This formulation is borrowed from McLeod’s 2014 SEP entry. 
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“spread” trust across domains, stemming from our susceptibility to the Fundamental 
Attribution Error. She might caution us that from the fact that a colleague is reliably 
punctual when it comes to attending department meetings you should not conclude that he 
will be reliably punctual in carpooling your children to daycare. Similarly, from the fact that 
your new lover has proved loyal in the face of temptation you should not infer that he will 
be true when passions subside. Because of the nature of our relationships with others, the 
evidence we have of their trustworthiness is often domain-specific. It is simply a matter of 
prudence, the situationist would maintain, to rein in our tendency to trust across domains. 
But it is crucial to notice that the kind of trust compatible with situationist’s denial of 
consistency - s-trust - goes far beyond prudence and domain-specificity. Doris dubs “the 
queasy realization” the thought that “had things been just a little different” (e.g. had I found a 
dime or been in a hurry) I might have behaved very differently (118, italics in original). The 
only remedy for this queasiness (and it is only a partial cure) is the exclusive reliance on local 
traits: “Person evaluations referencing local traits require confidence only that people will 
behave similarly in iterated trials of highly similar situations, and this confidence may survive 
the queasy realization.” (118, italics in original) But the criterion of similarity of situation is 
often very eccentric. The sorts of circumstances that undermine dispositions include 
trivialities such as finding a dime, hearing the noise of a lawnmower, or smelling baked bread 
– aspects of the situation that the agent herself may not even be aware of, and were she 
aware of them would deem irrelevant to her deliberation.  
If the situationist characterization is correct, then there seems to be no antecedent way to 
know the disjunction of circumstances in which local traits will manifest themselves.13 
Perhaps Seth’s reliability with regard to not embarrassing Ingrid will falter because 
temptation happens to come in the form of delectable macaroons. Or perhaps because of 
his glucose levels at that particular time of day, or the fact that one of the guests reminds 
him of his mother, the situation-type will have been altered. Surely, however, genuine trust is 
not compatible with a similarly long, idiosyncratic list of provisos many of which will be 
unknown to the potential trustor or to the trustee. There are a multitude of possible situation 
types within even a very narrow pre-determined domain of trust. So, s-trust and prudently 
domain-specific trust are not equivalent. Even very carefully circumscribed trust requires 
belief in the trustee’s capacity for cross-situational consistency.  
Situationists explain the apparent consistency in people’s behavior by appeal to the 
supposition that people frequently find themselves in similar situations.14 This allows the 
situationist to account for the fact that we do not seem to act in random, uncharacteristic, or 
unpredictable ways. And the explanation is reasonable as far as it goes: we may make a 
simple inductive inference from behavioral regularity in the past to behavioral regularity in 
the future.15 But the distinctive state of mind required for trust necessitates more than just 
the expectation of similarity of behavior grounded in anticipated similarity of situation. In 
order to trust someone, you must have the normative expectation that they will act in a 
trustworthy way in the face of non-excusing alterations to situation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This point came out of my collaboration with Rachel Cohon on our project on promising. 
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   10	  
This is true even if you anticipate that these alterations are relatively unlikely. If you think 
that your babysitter will fail to take good care of your child if her friends come to visit the 
house, then you do not really trust your babysitter even if you think it is unlikely that her 
friends will stop by. For consider, you may think that it is just as unlikely that your babysitter 
will have an aneurism than that your babysitter’s friends will visit (perhaps she is an au pair 
whose friends live in a faraway country). But if she fails to take reasonable care of your child 
because of the distraction of her friends, you will be indignant; if she fails because of an 
aneurism, moral indignation has no place. Failing to take adequate care of your child in the 
former circumstance is a strong indication that your babysitter lacks sufficient commitment 
to do what she is trusted to do. Her neglect is therefore expressive of moral indifference, and 
you will respond with indignation. In contrast, suffering from an aneurism constitutes a clear 
excusing condition and so you will not interpret her failure as expressive of ill will or moral 
indifference. These aspects of the trusting relationship are not based in predictability. 
Reliance based on predictability only allows you to trust your babysitter in the minimal sense 
that you trust your household appliances.  
 
§4 Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Reactive Attitudes 
Let us return to Ingrid, Seth, and the macaroons. Were Ingrid a situationist, how should she 
feel when Seth’s reliability is undermined by an esoteric situational pressure resulting in a 
failure to do what he is trusted to do? Should she feel betrayed? She may well feel 
disappointed in her expectation that Seth did not pull through, especially given his track 
record of rarely letting her down when it comes to public embarrassment. But if Ingrid 
adopts wholeheartedly the situationist stance on character, she will not have the normative 
expectation that Seth will be consistent, since she will not believe that Seth has the capacity 
for reliable dispositions across situation-types. Moreover, she will be aware that she does not 
have dependable ways of individuating and identifying the wide array of situation types that 
may destabilize Seth. Consequently, feelings of betrayal would seem misplaced.  
A distinctive mark of genuine trust is that it renders us vulnerable in a very particular way. In 
contexts where we trust another and we are let down, we do not feel mere disappointment in 
the way that we feel disappointment when a furnace gives up the ghost or a car breaks down. 
We feel let down in a distinctive way: hurt, resentful, betrayed. Conversely, when a person 
we trust comes through for us, especially in the face of trying circumstances, we feel 
something more than happiness. We feel grateful, perhaps even touched. These 
considerations begin to give a sense of the intrinsic value of trust. Trust is far more than a 
means of realizing efficiencies in social interaction. As Richard Holton puts it, “trusting 
someone is one way of treating them as a person.” (67) As such, trust plays an essential role 
in cultivating and sustaining relationships of love, respect, and intimacy. Holton describes 
the case of two people who begin rock climbing together: 
I have a choice between taking your hand, or taking the rope. I might think 
each equally reliable; but I can have a reason for taking your hand that I do not 
have for taking the rope. In taking your hand, I trust you; in so doing our 
relationship moves a little further forward. This can itself be something I value. 
We need not imagine that you would be hurt if I chose the rope over your 
hand; you might be perfectly understanding of the needs of the neophyte 
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climber. But our relationship would not progress. (68) 
	  
Just as the value of trust goes far beyond social coordination, betrayal of trust goes beyond 
mere disappointment. When our trust is betrayed we often feel that we have been made a fool 
of. That we have allowed someone to make a fool of us can be, in extreme cases, degrading 
and even humiliating. Non-persons cannot have this kind of power over us. When I trust the 
sturdiness of a bench and it turns out that my trust is misplaced, I may well feel like a fool. 
But I will not feel that I have been made a fool of unless my trust in the bench derives from my 
trust in a person who led me to sit on the bench.  
Holton (1994) notices that this network of responses form part of what P.F. Strawson (1974) 
dubbed the reactive attitudes. Behind the specific attitudes of gratitude and resentment, moral 
esteem and moral indignation, stands a more general attitude that Strawson calls the 
participant attitude and Holton calls the participant stance. Readiness to feel gratitude or 
resentment is partially constitutive of the stance although we might not always take up the 
appropriate attitude even when it is deserved. We might, for instance, forswear resentment. 
But forswearing resentment is different from having no readiness to feel it. The 
thoroughgoing adoption of situationism, I argue, undercuts all such readiness. 
Trusting is one way of treating someone as the sort of person who is capable of having 
dispositions that can be relied upon. Judgments that bear on whether to take up the 
participant stance toward a particular individual are in part judgments about this capacity. 
This should not be taken to imply that this stance is not an all-or-nothing affair. Even when 
you trust someone, you need not trust them in every way. It is possible, in fact very 
common, to trust a person in one sphere without trusting them in others. The adoption of 
situationism, however, infects all trust because situationism is a thesis not about the 
vulnerability of particular types of people in particular types of situations, but a thesis about 
people’s capacity for consistency in general.  
The thoroughgoing situationist will withdraw from the reactive attitudes relating to trust. 
Consequently, she will not suffer the indignity of being made a fool of, since she will not put 
herself at risk of betrayal because of another’s lack of consistency. Although such withdrawal 
might be sensible in specified contexts (when one is dealing with addicts or with young 
children, for instance), it is different matter entirely to generalize this stance to all aspects of 
life as a part of a comprehensive disavowal of confidence in character. As a result, I think 
that situationists misapprehend the ultimate implications of their own theory. Doris claims 
quite explicitly that situationist ethics does not require a substantial reworking of ordinary 
ethical thought: “[M]y skepticism is not radically revisionary – generally problematizing ethical 
thought – but conservatively revisionary – problematizing only particular, and dispensable, 
features of ethical thought associated with characterological moral psychology.” (108) Doris 
maintains that we can be justified in expressing a full range of reactive attitudes including 
guilt, indignation, and recrimination as well as moral esteem while safely disposing of notions 
of character (129). According to him, we must simply delimit our moral evaluations to an 
individual’s motives and forswear assessment of a person’s character.  
But much guilt, indignation, and recrimination, as well as feelings of moral esteem and 
admiration, are rooted in our sense that individuals (including ourselves) ought be worthy of 
the trust that we place in them, which in turn is rooted in the normative expectation of 
consistency. Situationism makes relying on others without hedging seem like a risky, naïve, 
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or even negligent, strategy. As a result, the situationist will resort to hedging strategies of 
various kinds. For example, a situationist may try to put into place safeguards to prevent 
others from acting in undesirable ways by manipulating aspects of the situation. Or she 
could lower the stakes for herself by bringing herself to care less about the significance of 
lapses. Finally, she may simply adopt the standing policy to “always have a Plan B”. All of 
these strategies serve as prophylaxis to vulnerability and disappointment. But while 
situationism insulates us from the injury of disappointing moral lapses, it systematically 
erodes our optimism that others are competent and committed to acting in ways that are 
compatible with a belief in their trustworthiness. 
Philosophical situationists may object that I have made too much of their claim that 
situationist ethics need not be radically revisionary. After all, situationists do call for 
eliminating moral discourse that appeals to character predicates, an approach that Doris 
himself allows is revisionary not only for Aristotelian virtue ethics but also for Kantian, 
contractualist, and even some strains of consequentialist ethics (Doris 2002, 107). If the 
situationist is ready to give up on honesty, courage, and compassion, then perhaps she will 
not object to my contention that she must give up on trustworthiness as well. So the 
situationist could reply that while my argument goes through, it lacks any real dialectical 
force against situationism. 
The problem with this approach is that it fails to recognize the way in which trustworthiness 
is conceptually distinct from widely acknowledged virtues like courage or compassion.16 
Doris, citing Thomson (1996), suggests that the situationist may still characterize an action as 
virtuous if all she means by this is that the person acted with certain motives and beliefs in a 
certain circumstance: “a just action involves the belief that the desired state of affairs is 
equitable, say, and a courageous action involves the belief that performing the action is more 
important than safety – but this need not involve reference to persisting dispositions.” (116) 
So, the reason situationist ethics is not radically revisionary is that we can still praise 
individuals for courageous actions and still blame individuals for cowardly actions even if we 
no longer attribute the character traits of courage or cowardice to them.  
But trustworthiness is inherently dispositional: “reference to persisting dispositions” is 
mandatory, not optional. It is part of the concept of trustworthiness that I can be 
trustworthy even if I am never called on to display my trustworthiness. While it is true that 
trustworthiness can be expressed in action, it does not make sense to characterize particular 
actions as “trustworthy” without assuming in the background dispositional reliability. The 
same goes, mutatis mutandis, for untrustworthiness. Contrariwise, it does make sense to talk 
of the “one-off” generous, courageous, or compassionate action that is unconnected to a 
persisting disposition. This is not, of course, to deny that a person may be trustworthy in one 
domain without being trustworthy in another. What moral psychologists refer to as “three-
place trustworthiness” – S is trustworthy with respect to A in D – explicitly builds in 
domain-specificity. I may trust you when it comes to professional matters but not when it 
comes to matters of the heart. Or I may think that my friend’s discretion can be relied on 
unless he has been drinking. But I cannot sensibly say, “I trust him unless some item on a 
long esoteric list of situational pressures, many of which neither he nor I can identify 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I will not here address the question of whether trustworthiness is a virtue.  See Potter 2002 for an answer in 
the affirmative and Jones 2012 for an answer in the negative.  What I have to say below is compatible with 
either kind of view. 
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antecedently, is brought to bear on him.” This would not be recognizable trust or 
trustworthiness.  
None of this is to deny that we may encounter “one-off” betrayals of trust just as we may 
encounter unexpected bursts of compassion or disappointing lapses of courage. One can feel 
let down by someone who is generally trustworthy, just as one can feel let down by a person 
of moral courage who has an uncharacteristic moment of spinelessness. Moreover, the 
correct description of a particular act as a betrayal of trust does not depend on any 
description of the long-standing character traits of the betrayer. Nonetheless, we typically do 
not trust others unless we think it is reasonable to hold them to the standard of doing what 
they are trusted to do across a wide range of situations. It is only against this background of 
expectation that judgments of trustworthiness together with the full range of reactive 
attitudes make sense. If you start to lose faith in a person’s competence to meet the 
normative expectation of actions consistent with good will, then you will eschew reliance by 
hatching contingency plans, or by trying to manipulate or coerce. These kinds of strategies 
constitute withdrawal (not always immediate) from the reactive attitudes, resulting in 
suspension of the characteristic attitudinal response to the perception of another person’s 
good will, ill will, or indifference.  
The situationist outlook has radically morally revisionary implications because of its 
fundamental incompatibility with self and interpersonal trust, essential dimensions of our 
moral lives. It is a dialectical felicity that Doris’s own conception of the distinction between 
“revisionary” and “radically revisionary” is also couched in the language of the reactive 
attitudes:  
I maintain that questions of responsibility substantially concern the 
propriety of “reactive attitudes”; the importance of responsibility 
assessment in large measure derives from its role in shaping moral 
responses as anger, resentment, approbation, and admiration. My claim, 
remember, is that situationist moral psychology is conservatively, not 
radically, revisionary – it does not erode materials required for a viable (and 
recognizably ethical) ethical practice. […] In the first instance, then, my 
problem is to show how my approach to responsibility can provide a 
psychologically rich underpinning for the reactive attitudes. (2002, 129) 
Doris’s own assessment of situationism’s moral revisionism is focused on the viability of 
doing away with the globalist moral emotion of shame. He does not consider the 
implications of situationist moral psychology for human relationships predicated on trust 
and belief in trustworthiness. But substantive reflection on what it means to live one’s life as 
a situationist must address the viability of the situationist outlook in light of the central 
importance of relationships of trust to our moral lives. As I have argued, full embrace of 
situationism results in progressive withdrawal from the reactive attitudes constitutive of the 
stance of trust. Moreover, all of the reactive attitudes that rely on trust are under analogous 
threat. These include those mentioned by Doris – “anger, resentment, approbation, and 
admiration” as well as others – indignation, hurt feelings, gratitude, reciprocal love, and 
forgiveness. Once we start seeing others as lacking the competence to carry off what they are 
trusted to do cross-situationally, this imperils the very coherence of holding them to a 
normative expectation of good will. This is because whether an agent succeeds in performing 
an action expressive of good will (or avoiding an action expressive of ill will or indifference) 
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is hostage to a host of situational pressures not antecedently identifiable, and so not 
amenable to the seek/avoid strategy Doris describes in the flirtatious colleague case.17  
So where does this leave situationism? If the situationist acknowledges both the 
indispensability of trust as well as the fundamental incompatibility of trust with the 
situationist outlook, she might suggest that we attempt to quarantine our attitudes and 
practices relating to trust from situationist critique. The situationist may counsel that we stop 
thinking like situationists when it comes to our trusting relationships. She might argue that 
even if the psychological evidence about the capacity for consistency vitiates the warrant for 
trust, trust is nonetheless psychologically desirable because of its role in sustaining human 
relationships and because of the respect it expresses. Even if trust is predicated on an 
illusion, it is an illusion that is deeply valuable. Situationists might find consolation in the way 
that some commentators have described trust as a moral virtue. Thomas Hurka, for example, 
maintains that trust is the virtue of “believing beyond one’s evidence in the virtues of 
particular people, such as one’s friends or family.” (2001, 108)  
But there is a marked difference between believing in the face of incomplete evidence, and 
believing despite the evidence. Believing in the human capacity for consistency despite 
evidence to the contrary is irrational, imprudent, and sometimes even negligent. Katherine 
Hawley puts it well: “[W]e owe it to ourselves and to others to place our trust appropriately, 
where such appropriateness depends at least in part on the trustworthiness of the trustee; 
this is especially important where we make decisions about trust which affect third parties.” 
(2012, 15) If indeed the consistency presupposed by global traits is as rare as the situationist 
believes it to be, then it would be very difficult to take up the stance of trust while knowing 
this. And even if we could accomplish this feat of cognitive and emotional quarantine, it 
would be foolhardy and irresponsible. Of course, we might try to convince ourselves that we 
are in special circumstances: situationists do not rule out the possibility that there may be 
exceptional individuals capable of cross-situational consistency. But we would have to start 
thinking about rational trust as something truly rare, and we would have to have confidence 
that we are able to identify those exceptional individuals who are worthy of it. 
A very different avenue open to the situationist might be to revisit their characterization of 
“local traits”, rendering them significantly less narrow and eccentric.18 If the domain of local 
traits were knowable ahead of time, then the situationist could attempt to organize her life 
around their contours, strategically avoiding situational pressures that threaten 
responsiveness to trust. But vexing problems still lurk. First, it is not always possible to avoid 
situations where local traits will be unreliable, so a responsible situationist may still have to 
eschew reliance on others and abjure their reliance on her. Second, although a substantial re-
conceptualization of local traits might help to answer my charge of radical ethical 
revisionism, I think it would constitute a major revision to situationism, significantly 
diminishing its distinctiveness and moral significance. Ultimately, the situationist faces a 
dilemma: either she must accept the radically morally revisionary implications of the 
situationist stance or character, or else she must radically revise situationism itself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The phrase “seek/avoid strategy” comes from Sarkissian (2010, 2).  It was pointed out to me by Michelle 
Mason that the interference of antecedently unidentifiable arational pressures threatens cross-situational 
normative expectations of any kind.. 
18 This avenue was suggested to me by William FitzPatrick. 
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There is one last avenue open to the situationist. She might claim that the context of 
interpersonal trust is exceptional, and that it lies outside of the domain of the situationist’s 
denial of consistency. To explain this anomaly, she might invoke what Philip Pettit (1995) 
dubs the “trust-responsiveness mechanism” whereby individuals are motivated to show 
themselves to be reliable when trusted because they desire the good opinion of others. If this 
mechanism were robust enough, it would do much to mitigate the queasiness of Doris’s 
“queasy realization”. But it would also represent a major revision of the situationist thesis 
since it would count as a way to neutralize the vaunted ‘power of the situation’ and to 
achieve a morally significant measure of cross-situational consistency. More importantly, 
thinking about trust this way would also require significant revision to the reactive attitudes. 
Pettit notes that trust-responsiveness (as opposed to the trait of trustworthiness) “counts by 
most peoples’ lights, not as a desirable feature for which they need to strive, but rather as a 
disposition – a neutral or even shameful disposition – that it is hard to shed.” (203) 
Consistency through trust-responsiveness does not merit gratitude or moral esteem, and the 
malfunction of the trust-responsiveness mechanism does not warrant feelings of betrayal.  
Trusting others requires being in a distinctive state of mind.19 When possessed of this state 
of mind, we are empowered to think and act in trustful ways. But a theoretical commitment 
that most others are constitutionally incapable of consistency, the position urged by 
situationist ethics, makes such a state of mind unattainable.  
Even worse, a person’s commitment to do what she is trusted to do will wither as her faith in 
her competency declines. One’s commitment to carry out an undertaking depends on the 
hope that one has the required capacity. Such hope is not reasonable for situationists who 
are honest with themselves. One would be remiss to invite the reliance of others if one did 
not think that one had the capacity to shoulder such reliance responsibly. Consequently, a 
situationist who is responsible will abjure the trust of others, a stance that excludes her from 
a broad swath of meaningful human engagement.  
§5 Conclusion: the value of trust 
Perhaps the situationist will maintain that as much as we would like for there be to be 
warrant for well-grounded trust, our desire does not make it so. But adopting an attitude of 
“trust no one” or “trust only as a last resort” is not a stance that is consistent with living a 
decent life, let alone one described as flourishing.  
The goods of trust are rich and varied. Trust not only serves as a social lubricant; trust 
signals respect. In general we want to be trusted, even if there is nothing in particular that we 
hope to gain by that trust. Indeed, to be distrusted without specific and sufficient reason can 
be insulting and even demeaning. Consider the indignation and subsequent resentment of a 
customer treated with suspicion by a shop’s proprietor even though he has no intention of 
stealing. To be scrutinized when one’s bearing provides no warrant for mistrust can plant the 
seeds of the kind of alienation expressed in behavior that does warrant mistrust. 
Many other philosophers have addressed the question of whether the extant psychological 
evidence supports the situationists’ contentions about the absence of character traits. The 
aim of this paper has been to illustrate the real implications of incorporating situationism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Holton (1994, 63). 
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into a moral stance. Such a stance undermines real trust, and requires us to adopt “hedging” 
strategies that are incompatible with deep social cooperation as well as interpersonal respect. 
The fact that we do often trust each other and that we do not conclude such trust is mislaid is 
prima facie evidence against the situationist’s claim about the extreme rarity of consistent 
dispositions. Of course, the situationist may well respond that this impression of the 
trustworthiness of others is generated and sustained by the Fundamental Attribution Error. 
But even if the situationist is correct in her contention that the empirical evidence rules out 
robust dispositions, she is still mistaken in thinking that her theory is not radically morally 
revisionary.  
A wholehearted situationist will avoid the jeopardy of trust whenever feasible because she 
endorses a thoroughgoing pessimism about people’s competency to reliably carry out what 
they are trusted to do. Ironically, this chariness can have the effect of actually making others 
less trustworthy, thereby reinforcing itself. Part of being a trustworthy person is that you 
take into account the fact that others are counting on you to pull through, that is, that others 
have expectations about your behavior that are embedded in their plans and goals in ways 
that affect their success.20 A trustworthy person gives high priority to the consideration “she 
is counting on me.” But the situationist, in abjuring trust by hedging and hatching 
contingency plans, avoids as much as possible reliance on others. As a result, the knowledge 
that one’s trustor is a situationist renders the thought “she is counting on me” markedly less 
urgent. A situationist does not count on others unless she cannot at all help it – an attitude 
that does not inspire.  
As I make clear at the outset of this paper, situationism is a descriptive theory and none of 
the considerations I adduce serve to disprove situationism. It is my view that the 
situationists’ sweeping denial of consistent dispositions is not supported by the empirical 
evidence, and so the adoption of situationism is misguided. But belief in situationism has 
morally troubling implications, even if such belief is false and unjustified. The moral 
consequence of situationism’s central claim – the denial of consistency – has yet to be 
adequately reckoned with. Tackling this issue head-on opens the way for new avenues of 
inquiry. For example, we must ask whether a person who disavows consistency and 
therefore lacks self-trust has, to borrow Nietzsche’s formulation, the right to make 
promises.21 
It is undeniable that individuals who allow themselves to trust will sometimes be let down, 
often in ways that are damaging, dispiriting, and even humiliating. This sort of experience 
can eat away at one’s faith in humanity, and so we are well advised not to be extravagant in 
extending our trust. But if I am right, the implications of situationism go far beyond a 
prudent skepticism about individual trustworthiness. On the situationist picture, beings with 
psychologies like ours are not constituted so as to be worthy of genuine trust. If we are to 
adopt situationist moral psychology, we should understand its true significance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Jones 2012, p. 64.  
21 This is the subject of a collaborative project on promises with Rachel Cohon that preceded this work on 
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